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Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that governments might usefully intervene
in high-technology competition in two ways: First, they could act as a neutral agent that cre-
ates the necessary credibility, commitment and mutual trust among private companies so as
to facilitate cooperation in high-risk, high-volume R&D. Second, if — in view of the externali-
ties involved — an element of subsidization is to be added, this could be done in a nondis-
criminatory fashion. A favourable tax treatment of R&D expenditures may be the most appro-
priate tool to achieve this task.
In practice, governments do engage in targeted industrial and technology policies, whether
justified on economic grounds or not. As a consequence, the string of trade conflicts in high-
tech industries that began in the 1980s is unlikely to end in the near future, unless substantial
reforms are undertaken in some crucial areas of the international trade order. Above all, ap-
propriate reform steps should be made with a view to the regulations on (i) subsidies, (ii)
structural impediments, and (iii) dumping and anti-dumping.
To mitigate the frictions that arise from a subsidization of domestic firms, a new set of rules
should be established. The rules should provide that all plans to grant or to alter existing
subsidies are to be notified to and approved by the WTO. Moreover, all subsidies should be
ranked according to their potential distortional effects on competition and trade. For each
category, quantitative limits that constrain the provision of subsidies to a certain fraction of
the subsidy base should be set. To facilitate further liberalization steps, a country should be
allowed to exceed these limits, if a national subsidy program offers an open access to firms
located in third markets.
Besides restrictive business practices of private firms, government regulations and technical
standards are the most important structural impediments to trade. Existing GATT Articles al-
ready offer a multilateral route to conflict resolution in cases of structural impediments. How-
ever, this route has not been used by complainants up to now. The so-called "non-violation"
clause of Article 23 GATT provides access to a multilateral dispute settlement even if the
defending country has not explicitly violated GATT rules. This route should be tested and, if
necessary, improved.
To reduce the potential for a protectionist abuse of existing anti-dumping regulations, explicit
reference to the state of competition in the relevant exporting and importing country markets
should be made in anti-dumping investigations. To meet specific anti-trust concerns in high-
tech competition — notably with respect to network externalities, systems leverage, stan-
dardization, and innovation cartels — one might consider adopting the Draft International
Antitrust Code (DIAC) that has recently been proposed by an international group of legal ex-
perts.
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High-Technology Development, Competition, and Trade ", jointly carried out by the National Re-
search Council of the US Academy of Sciences, Washington, the HWWA-Institute for Economic Re-
search, Hamburg, and the Kiel Institute of World Economics. It presents the joint final report of the
HWWA-Institute for Economic Research and the Kiel Institute of World Economics. The report great-
ly benefitted from the encouragement and financial support by the German-American Academic
Council Foundation (GAAC).
The objective of the report is to discuss the economic rationale of national research and develop-
ment policies in light of recent theoretical and empirical work on intraregional and interregional
knowledge diffusion (Chapter I) and to present reform proposals for crucial areas of the international
trade order (subsidies and public procurement; market access and structural impediments; dumping,
anti-dumping, and competition policies) that aim at mitigating the frictions that are arising from
national industrial policies (Chapter II).
The report was jointly produced by staff members of the HWWA-Institute for Economic Research
and the Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW). Chapter I and Section II. I were written by Karl-
Heinz Paque, Jiirgen Stehn, and Ernst-Jurgen Horn of the IfW, Sections II.2 and II.3 by Hans-Eckart
Scharrer and Georg Koopmann of the HWWA-Institute, respectively.
I. The Economics of Technology Policies in Globalised Markets
1. Analytical Benchmarks
To a large extent, international frictions in markets for high-tech products are the consequence of some
form of unilateral state intervention. Using a large variety of instruments, many governments grant
support to specific branches of economic activity whose growth is deemed to be beneficial or even
crucial for the long-term performance of the national economy. The policy toolbox ranges from overt
protectionism and subsidisation to more covert barriers to market entry such as discrimination in public
procurement, product standards and distributional networks. Whatever their specific shape may be, the
instruments are usually part of a more or less coherent growth strategy that is well summed up under the
terms "technology policy" or "industrial policy".
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Many of the more popular arguments for technology policies in high-tech markets can easily be
refuted with standard economic reasoning and are therefore no serious candidates for further scrutiny.
2
The more powerful case for technology policy — and the one that is most likely to dominate future
debate on trade frictions in high-tech markets — comes from two modern strands of economic research
that are both analytically important and politically relevant: endogenous growth theory and strategic
trade theory.
a. Endogenous Growth Theory
Some strands of endogenous growth theory — notably the pioneering work by Grossman and Helpman
(1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a, 1991b) —
3 have focused on the link between international
trade integration and the concomitant changes of sectoral specialisation patterns on the one hand and the
long-run growth prospects of a country on the other. This work contains a vast array of rather complex
analytical insights that may also be of interest for selected questions of economic policy. With some
courageous simplifications, the policy gist of the work — as far as it is relevant for technology policy in
advanced economies — may be summarised as follows.
4International trade patterns in (free) high-tech markets are determined by comparative advantages.
More than in other markets, however, these comparative advantages may be affected by the resources
that different economies devote to industrial research, i.e. to investment into the creation of new knowl-
edge. But not each and every piece of new industrial knowledge does affect trade patterns; whether it
does depends, most importantly, on the subsequent diffusion of this knowledge, i.e., in economists'
jargon, on the degree of localisation of technological spillovers. In this respect, two polar cases deserve
attention as conceptual benchmarks: knowledge as a global good and knowledge as a national good.
If the spillovers are essentially global, i.e. if competitors in all relevant countries have access to any
addition to the (common) knowledge pool wherever it comes from, there will be no lasting effects of
national research efforts on trade patterns, and one is back at standard explanations of trade in terms of
national endowments with ordinary production factors, notably labour, human capital and physical
capital. In these circumstances, national technology policy makes little economic sense because what it
helps to create in terms of new knowledge will easily diffuse outside the country without giving
domestic producers a viable and persistent advantage over foreign competitors.
If, on the other hand, knowledge spillovers remain geographically concentrated and thus essentially
national in scope, then a cumulative process of what may be called "national learning" may set in and
drive a widening competitive wedge between the respective national industry and the rest of the world:
in the extreme, a country starting with a tiny and accidental technological lead may eventually dominate
the relevant world market because it profits — alone and persistently — from its own knowledge
creation, which allows it to lower costs, to raise quality levels and to introduce new products and
production processes. In these circumstances, a national technology policy may well have a powerful
rationale: if private producers do not make the socially optimal decisions — in economists' jargon: if
there is a market failure — government may step in to initiate the virtuous high-tech growth circle.
Is the market likely to fail? Among the cases of potential market failure that have been identified in
the literature, two stand out in importance, one focusing on positive externalities of private R&D
spending, the other on negative ones. The argument on positive externalities recognises a tendency
towards private underinvestment in R&D due to any positive spillover contributions to the (national)
stock of knowledge that cannot be appropriated in a private calculus of profit maximisation. The
government is then called upon to raise the level of research effort in the industry at hand.
The argument on negative externalities identifies a tendency towards overinvestment due to inefficient
parallel research: with a limited common pool of potential discoveries and innovations at any point in
time, a successful innovation is likely to reduce the prospective commercial value of research efforts by
other firms, a form of negative (pecuniary) externality that is not properly taken into account by private
agents.
5 The government may then be called upon to reduce, or better: to bundle and focus the research
efforts so as to ensure a maximum expected social rate of return and a minimum deadweight loss.
Which instruments of intervention should the government use? In the case of positive externalities,
the modern theories of endogenous growth recommend public support directly of R&D activities rather
than general protectionist measures for the respective industrial branch, say, in the form of production
subsidies or tariffs. This is in line with the more traditional welfare analysis of externalities in trade
theory,
6 though the underlying rationale of the result is somewhat different: while traditional theory
wants the government to avoid static allocative losses, the modern theory wants it to avoid a (growth-
hindering) resource competition for skilled labour that may be used both in manufacturing and in
research. For instance, production subsidies or tariff protection for the production of a high-tech good
may induce highly qualified engineering personnel to move from research into production, thus in-
creasing the cost of R&D and reducing the country's potential for growth.
A similar argument for direct intervention applies for the case of negative externalities, though it has
not yet been spelled out in detail in the literature: if a "bundling" of R&D efforts is required to reduce
inefficient parallel research, it should be done by allowing firms to cooperate so as to rationalise and co-
ordinate some of their research investment, possibly under government auspices and encouragement.b. Strategic Trade Theory
Some modern strands of trade theory — beginning with the pioneering work by Brander and Spencer
(1983, 1985) and Dixit and Kyle (1985) — have focused on the international rivalry for monopoly rents
in world markets that operate under conditions of highly imperfect competition, usually involving only
very few producers from different countries. This rivalry can have the characteristic that possibly
accidental initial advantages of one firm lead to high monopoly profits because potential competitors are
deterred from market entry by high start-up costs and/or the narrowness of the prospective market.
Once again, the details of the relevant theoretical models are complex, but the case for government
intervention in the form of so-called strategic trade policy is simple and straightforward: by granting a
temporary subsidy to a newcomer, the government may turn potential competitors into actual ones, thus
breaking up a (quasi-)monopolistic market position of the dominant foreign producer(s) and shifting at
least some of the monopoly rents from one country to the other. If, in the end, national subsidy costs are
lower than the gain in rents, then the active policy stance pays off from a national point of view.
Note that, in the technology policy debate, the case for a strategic trade policy does hardly come
neatly separated from arguments based on endogenous growth theory. For instance, the case for the
European Union's long-standing effort to break up the American quasi-monopoly in the world market
for commercial aircraft has been consistently justified on two grounds: shifting rents across the Atlantic
and laying the ground for the expansion of a high-tech industry that was regarded as greatly beneficial
in terms of internal and external learning processes for future economic growth in Europe. In fact, the
American lead in aircraft and related technologies was widely identified as being the consequence of a
costly learning process that any prospective European competitor would still have to go through.
2. Empirical Evidence
What do we know about the prospects for a successful technology policy in actual reality? Or more
specifically: What do we know about the extent to which there are cumulative processes of external
learning that are geographically concentrated? And what do we know about the extent to which there are
monopoly rents to be shifted around internationally? It may not come as a surprise that any serious
economist can hardly avoid to answer all of these questions with: very little. Our current ignorance
simply reflects the enormous problems of empirically isolating and measuring the relevant phenomena,
not to speak of identifying causal relationships.
To be sure, there is a large literature of individual case studies, in which selected high tech branches
or markets are picked to demonstrate the success or failure of particular government measures. In the
context of the bilateral trade disputes between the United States and Japan, some of these studies have
received considerable public attention, notably the book by Tyson (1992).
7 These studies suffer from
major methodological deficiencies: despite their wealth of information and interpretation, they offer
neither a theory-based empirical account of the diffusion of knowledge or the shifting of rents nor a
reasonably specified counterfactual scenario that would allow to pin down with some conceptual
precision to what extent government intervention in fact altered the path of economic history.
The example of Japanese industrial policies is notorious in this respect.
8 To qualify as a valuable
piece of economic analysis, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that there was some intervention in some
industrial branch and that producers in this branch were increasingly successful in world markets; it has
rather to be shown that the relevant path of events was sufficiently different from what could have been
expected on the basis of factor endowments and learning processes that went on anyway, independently
of government action.
It is an a priori open question whether the remarkable world market penetration that Japanese
industry achieved in the mass production of cameras, automobiles and semiconductors was the "naturalcrop" of the specific engineering skills that the Japanese education and training system tends to provide
(like, say, the German or the Swiss one) or whether it was the "artificial consequence" of smart
technology policy initiatives, or part of both. To come closer to an answer, one would have to study
carefully the dynamics of comparative advantages over time and across countries, testing for elements
of path dependence and hysteresis in specialisation patterns of production and trade,
9 and linking this to
government interventions. Clearly, the case studies available so far fall well short of this standard.
Apart from the more descriptive case studies, however, there is a small but growing literature that
makes a serious econometric attempt at identifying phenomena that are relevant for technology policy
making. In the following paragraphs, we will provide a brief review of important recent pieces of
empirical analysis — first of those concerning external learning effects and growth, and second of those
concerning rent-shifting through strategic trade policy.
1
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a. External Learning and Growth
There has been a large number of studies over the last three decades which, in one way or another, try to
measure and quantify spillover effects of R&D. While many of them are flawed and subject to a variety
of reservations, they do on the whole support the view that R&D spillovers are positive and
quantitatively important.
1
1 We shall strictly focus on those (relatively few and recent) studies that
investigate the regional and sectoral incidence of learning effects and externalities, which is the core
issue for the design of technology policies.
The Case of the Semiconductor Industry
In recent years, the semiconductor industry has been at centre stage of the technology policy debate, not
least because it is widely regarded as a strategic industry in the sense that the production of
semiconductors involves strong learning effects (and thus cost reductions) over time and that
semiconductors are used as high-tech inputs in virtually all branches of any modern economy.^ Irwin
and Klenow (1994a) deliver the first serious econometric attempt to estimate the actual magnitude of
internal and external learning effects as well as the geographic concentration of externalities for the
semiconductor industry.
On the basis of a large set of quarterly data for the period 1974-92 and for roughly 30 semiconductor
producers in the United States, Europe and East Asia (Japan and South Korea), the study provides
estimates of how strongly the product price depends on past production of semiconductors (i) in the firm
itself, (ii) in the country where the firm is located, and (iii) in the world as a whole. In the absence of
cost data, the product price is taken as a proxy for "dynamic" marginal production cost,
1
3 i.e the
marginal cost that takes into account the discounted value of all future cost reductions due to production
experience; cumulative past production is taken as a proxy for the cumulative production experience
and thus for the level of technical knowledge, i.e. the stage of the learning process. Also, an explicit
distinction is made between cumulative experience within a production line — i.e., within the current
generation of memory chips — and the experience with earlier production lines, i.e. with older memory
chip generations.
The results of Irwin and Klenow (1994a) are remarkable and important. They find strong learning
effects within each chip generation — on average a 20 per cent cost reduction with a doubling of output
over time. However, they find no significant learning effects between chip generations: any new quality
stage of technological development in the form of a new generation of memory ships begins with a level
playing field. They also find rather powerful externalities: additional output (and thus additional
experience) of other firms leads to a cost reduction of roughly one third of a corresponding output in-
crease of the firm itself. What they do not find, however, is a significant difference between inter-
national and mfranational externalities: knowledge spillovers — as far as they exist — appear to be un-disturbed by national borders. Also, the authors of the study do not find any significant difference in the
structural parameters of learning and external effects between Japanese and other firms.
All in all, these results cast serious doubt on whether the popular idea that there are powerful first-
mover advantages for early market entrants is really compatible with the empirical record of the semi-
conductor industry. Prima facie, the simple observation that Japanese semiconductor producers — after
a prolonged period of spectacular world market penetration — lost again world market shares to
American competitors by the late 1980s, seems to point in the same direction. However, the inter-
pretation of this fact is complicated by two major policy shifts that may have influenced the course of
events, namely the conclusion of two US-Japanese semiconductor trade agreements, which brought
some protectionist relief to American producers, and the establishing of SEMATECH, the joint in-
dustry-government research consortium in the American semiconductor industry.
With respect to the trade agreements, there is by now a broad consensus that they came too late —
the first in 1986 — to prevent a fundamental restructuring of American industry away from the mass
production of DRAMS
1
4 to more profitable market segments (e.g., design intensive chips). With the
benefit of hindsight, one can say that this turned out to be a blessing because of the rising tide of
competitive pressures from South Korean producers that forcefully entered the DRAM market and
undermined the dominating Japanese position.
1
5
With respect to the economic impact of SEMATECH, there has been a first econometric attempt at
estimation, again by Irwin and Klenow (1994b). Using data on American semiconductor firms, i.e. on
those which were members of SEMATECH in the relevant period and those which were not (and which,
statistically, form a control group), the authors estimate the effects of the consortium on the members'
R&D spending, profitability, investment and productivity. Their results turn out to be conclusive only
for the effect on R&D spending: they indicate that SEMATECH has reduced R&D spending by roughly
$300 million per year. In terms of the two alternative theoretical interpretations of technology policy
presented above (see Section I.I.a), this supports the view that SEMATECH has served as an
instrument to focus and bundle research, i.e. to reduce inefficient parallel efforts, rather than to expand
the research scope into ranges that would otherwise not have been profitable to explore by private
member firms.
J 6
While SEMATECH may thus have helped firms to coordinate their research efforts efficiently, there
is by now broad agreement that this piece of positive technology policy can hardly be made responsible
for the bulk of the recovery of the American semiconductor industry.
1
7 Instead, the timely restructuring
of the industry appears to have done by itself the major part of the work. In view of the econometric
evidence about the powerful international diffusion of technological knowledge in this high tech
industry, one should not be surprised to see one country's producers recover quite successfully even
from rather deep adjustment crises.
1
8
Knowledge Diffusion: International and Interregional
Coe and Helpman (1993) attempt to quantify international knowledge spillovers between industrial
economies.
1
9 On the basis of annual data for the period 1971-1990 and 22 mostly OECD countries,
they estimate how strongly total factor productivity in any country depends on the "research capital
stock" (i) in this country itself and (ii) in all other countries. The domestic "research capital stock" is
defined as total national R&D expenditure, accumulated over time using a certain rate of "knowledge
depreciation"; the total foreign research capital is calculated as a weighted average of all other
countries, with the weights being bilateral import quota, i.e. — roughly speaking — the degree of trade
integration.
The authors find that total factor productivity in a country depends strongly on the domestic research
capital: according to their estimates, a 1 per cent increase of the research capital stock leads to a 0.25
per cent productivity increase. They also find that foreign research capital matters as well, but that it
matters comparatively more for smaller countries than for large ones. In fact, for small highly integratedeconomies, research efforts in the main trading-partner countries appear to matter at least as much as
corresponding efforts at home. Apparently, trade between advanced economies —and with it inter-
national capital movements — appear to be powerful channels for transmitting technological knowledge
across borders, a result which tends to support the estimates and message of Irwin and Klenow (1994a)
in the narrower context of the semiconductor industry.
On interregional knowledge spillovers, there are two major studies that are directly relevant for the
policy questions at hand. Jaffe et al. (1993) exploit the geographic information contained in U.S. patent
statistics to draw econometric inferences on the extent to which the diffusion of knowledge remains
localised after an innovation has been made in some place of the country. The central piece of in-
formation on which they build their econometrics is the geographic pattern of patent citations to be
found in new patent applications, which can serve as a kind of road map to track knowledge spillovers.
While the methodology is rich and complex in detail,
2
0 the results are rather clear-cut. First of all,
they point towards quite strong localisation effects, with the degree of localisation being higher for
patents of private firms than for those of universities, which is plausible because purely academic
research results are likely to be circulated more openly than the knowledge created in private research
laboratories. Second, for any patent, localisation tends to decline over time, but very slowly so: even a
decade after a patent is granted, the geographic diffusion pattern remains little changed for all practical
purposes. And third, the high degree of geographic localisation is not matched by a corresponding
degree of sectoral localisation: whatever the grouping of patents into technological or industrial seg-
ments, there is always a remarkably high share of citations that refer to patents in very different fields.
This casts some doubt on the common assumption that cumulative learning processes within a well-
defined high-tech industry are a valid rationale for technology policy.
This last result has received independent support from another strand of research on interregional
knowledge spillovers, which applies ideas of endogenous growth theory to the study of urban agglom-
erations. In a major contribution on the economic determinants of city growth, Glaeser et al. (1992) test
two competing hypotheses, one identifying knowledge spillovers within an industry, the other one spill-
overs between industries as the driving force of output and employment growth. Using a large data set
on the structure of industry for 170 metropolitan areas in the United States for the time 1956-1987, the
authors estimate to what extent the long-term growth of a city industry was positively or negatively
correlated with a number of characteristics of local industry structure, most importantly the degree of
specialisation (i) of the respective industry and (ii) of the rest of the urban economy.
The results are again rather clearcut: other things being equal, an industry tends to grow faster in
cities where it is still underrepresented and where the rest of the urban economy has a low degree of
industrial specialisation. Hence, as in the research on patent knowledge diffusion, an empirical case can
be made for inter-industrial rather than intra-industrial spillovers dominating the picture.
2
1
b. Strategic Trade Policy: The Aircraft Industry
Rent-shifting in high-tech markets through deliberate government intervention has been an explicit aim
of policy in one particular branch of economic activity: the aircraft industry. Naturally, it has been this
industry and in particular the economics of the European launching of Airbus as a competitor of Boeing
that was subjected to empirical analysis, notably by Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Klepper (1990,
1994).
2
2 For a number of reasons ranging from the duopolistic market structure to simple lack of data,
all these empirical studies consist of model calibration and simulation rather than econometric esti-
mation of theory-based parameters.
2
3 This is why all results must be interpreted with utmost caution
because they depend crucially on the models' assumptions and imputed parameters.
The policy-relevant core of these studies consists in answering the following double question: to what
extent and for what economic reason did the subsidised market entry of Airbus — and thus the trans-
formation of the aircraft market from a (prospective) monopoly of Boeing into a transatlantic duo-poly — lead to a redistribution of producer and consumer surplus in the United States, in Europe and in
the rest of the world? Despite considerable methodological differences, the answers to these questions do
not differ greatly between the relevant studies.
Briefly summarised, the answers read as follows. The market entry and continued market presence of
Airbus has led or will lead to a loss of producer surplus in the United States due to the reduction of
(monopoly) profits and a gain of consumer surplus all over the world due to lower aircraft prices.
However, European consumers/taxpayers are likely to end up worse off because the additional tax
burden may well overcompensate the gain in consumer surplus. Also, world welfare as a whole is likely
to be reduced because the loss of producer surplus in the United States may well overcompensate the
world-wide gains in consumer surplus (net of the tax burden), a result which reflects the enormous
importance of economies of scale in the aircraft industry: given very sharp cost reductions through
learning effects, the socially optimal outcome for the world as a whole may simply be a monopoly.
The central conclusion from these results is that, in economic terms, the European Airbus venture is
better interpreted as a world-wide anti-monopoly policy rather than a transatlantic rent-shifting:
European consumers/taxpayers foot the bill of breaking an American monopoly to the unambiguous
advantage of consumers in the rest of the world.
2
4 Whether one likes this policy or not, it has very little
to do with the idea of a genuine strategic trade policy that postulates a national interest in rent-shifting
as the normative basis for government intervention, and not an altruistic policy stance vis-a-vis the rest
of the world.
Needless to say that one may put forward other arguments for fostering a European aircraft industry
as an important high-tech branch, but these usually lead into the realm of technological spillovers (see
Section 1.2.a). To our knowledge, there have been no systematic empirical assessments of the aircraft
industry with respect to technological externalities. Casual observations — e.g. the apparent failure of
Germany's Daimler-Benz to profit from so-called synergy effects between aircraft and motor car
production
2
5 — suggest that these effects have been grossly overestimated in the past and have lured
some firms into a path of diversification that turned out to be unprofitable in the longer run.
There is a more general conclusion to be drawn from the empirical studies on rent-shifting that goes
well beyond the aircraft market. Obviously, the aircraft industry is almost a textbook case for an
industry with strong economies of scale and, consequently, very few commercial players and fat
monopoly margins: if even in this industry it is very hard to channel rents into the pockets of producers
in the intervening country, how can one ever arrive at a powerful case for government intervention on
these grounds in other industries that are much further away from the conditions of a natural monopoly?
One may suspect that the chances to do so are small at best.
3. Technology Policy: Some Cautious Conclusions
Despite the vast uncharted territories that still await future research — notably in the field of econo-
metrically scrutinising the various dimensions of knowledge diffusion — some preliminary conclusions
may be drawn from the available evidence surveyed above:
(i) Knowledge spillovers appear to be a pervasive feature of modern economies that is likely to be of
great importance for economic growth. There is still much less clarity about how the knowledge dif-
fusion actually works, although there are some patches of relevant evidence: studies on the interregional
diffusion process point to strong localisation effects in terms of geography, but not in terms of sectors of
economic activity; in turn, studies on international diffusion point to powerful spillovers across national
borders, be it on a macroeconomic level or for a selected important high-tech industry, namely semi-
conductors. The apparent contradiction between the empirical results from interregional and inter-
national studies may have its cause in a genuine "globalisation" of knowledge flows: it is not im-10
plausible to suspect that the leading high-tech centres in different countries may be better linked in terms
of communication than the high-tech centres and the periphery in one single (large) country.
(ii) The aim of shifting monopoly rents between countries does not make by itself a case for govern-
ment intervention. The one instant where it was obviously relevant — the aircraft industry — is history
since Airbus is by now an established competitor of the former (quasi-)monopolist Boeing. Whether the
launching of Airbus was a policy success depends on the criteria used. Be that as it may, no comparably
structured high-tech branch, where fat monopoly profits accrue in just one country, is in sight in the
near future.
(hi) The actual record of government intervention in high-tech industries is very hard to evaluate
because, usually, no sensible counterfactual scenario can be made available. However, there is one im-
portant case where such a scenario has been at least tentatively constructed: SEMATECH. The relevant
analysis of SEMATECH indicates that the consortium helped to reduce — arguably inefficient —
parallel research, thus pointing to a positive role of the government as an agent that bundles and focuses
rather than expands research efforts.
Back to the basic question: Is there a theoretically sound and empirically supported rationale for gov-
ernment intervention in high-tech markets? Given the extent of our ignorance of the precise determinants
and structure of knowledge flows, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a government in an advanced
economy has exactly the same information problem as the empirical economist in tracing the relevant
knowledge flows. Hence a fine-structured industrial policy targeted at selected high-tech industries can
hardly be recommended.
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may suggest that a "technology policy" aimed at generally supporting the (otherwise suboptimal)
growth of high-tech agglomerations, can make economic sense. The problem is, of course, how this
should be done with a minimum risk of incurring deadweight losses for taxpayers and consumers. Some
reasonable guidelines may read as follows:
(1) In selecting instruments of government intervention, one should aim at supporting R&D itself and
not output or trade because output subsidies and trade policies do invariably have undesirable allocative
side effects, not to speak of the potential for political frictions that may come to the fore once countries
engage in protectionist warfare in high-tech markets.
(2) When choosing R&D for government support, one should consider whether the apparent market
failure cannot be corrected through what may be called "government coordination" rather than through
subsidies. Finding an economically efficient level and structure of industry research by jointly launching
particularly large and risky projects or by weeding out costly parallel research is eventually in the
interest of all firms concerned; and at least in high-tech markets that are characterised by (not too wide)
oligopolies, firms may be ready to cooperate in research. Hence the government may simply serve as a
positively neutral agent that creates the necessary credibility, commitment and mutual trust among the
private parties so as to make the joint venture possible at all. With the benefit of hindsight, SEMATEC
may in fact be interpreted in this way, given its apparently successful record and its decision in 1994 to
continue its operation into the second half of the 1990s, but to renounce on government money, which
had previously made up about half of its funds.
Of course, even such a modest government role does create problems. First, it requires a precise
definition in anti-trust law under which pre-competitive circumstances a R&D joint venture does not fall
under the ban on collusions. In practice, any exemption clause will be abused to some extent so that the
likely damage of abuse will have to be put onto the debit account of any (government-sponsored) co-
operation. Second, it requires a decision to what extent foreign firms are permitted to participate. Again,
there is a conflict: on one side, the very rationale of technology policy is to foster national high-tech ag-
glomerations, and not the ones in other countries; on the other hand, the participation of foreign firms
may be the only feasible way to tap a foreign stock of knowledge that may be crucial to obtain or pre-
serve the competitive edge of domestic industry. Even if foreign firms were excluded from participating11
in a government-sponsored cooperation, however, they may acquire the relevant knowledge by taking
over a firm that does participate.
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prepared to make very serious inroads into the freedom of capital movements.
(3) If an element of subsidisation is to be added to the package of government R&D support, it
should be done in a non-discriminatory fashion. This means — roughly speaking — that any dollar or
deutschmark spent on R&D should be subsidised at the same rate, no matter in which branch of econ-
omic activity it is invested. This of course means that high-tech branches with high ratios of R&D
spending to value added receive a higher subsidy per unit of value added; but this "discrimination" is
perfectly compatible with the externality-based logic of the subsidy because they are also the branches
whose output is likely to be the furthest below the social optimum. In practice, a favourable tax treat-
ment of R&D may be the most appropriate tool to achieve this task.
Of course, one may wonder whether most industrialised countries — including the United States and
Germany — do not already have an implicit R&D subsidy implemented in their tax codes, though
maybe for reasons that have nothing to do with a conscious and deliberate effort to support R&D. An
implicit R&D subsidy can be recognised in two distinct elements of the tax code.
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incurred in R&D can be deducted as current expenditure like labour costs incurred in production, al-
though they are economically more like an investment in future knowledge creation and thus, in a
neutral tax code, would have to be treated like an investment in physical capital, which can only be de-
ducted over time according to some schedule of depreciation. Second, the value of the knowledge output
that is not sold in the market for patents and licences but kept for exclusive use in the company, is not
counted as an asset for tax purposes. This amounts to a positive discrimination of the knowledge stock
vis-a-vis that part of the physical capital stock that is produced by the firm itself. While these tax rules
may not be optimal from an economic perspective, they do constitute a considerable element of R&D
support and maybe a starting-point for a "non-mercantilistic technology policy".
II. Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Agenda for Action
1. Subsidies and Public Procurement
a. Towards an Open Subsidy Club
2
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Subsidies are one of the most important instruments for the promotion of high-technology industries.
The share of public funding in private R&D expenditures varies between 11 and 33 per cent in leading
OECD countries, with the remarkable exception of Japan where public subsidies cover only 1.5 per cent
of private R&D outlays (Bletschacher and Klodt 1992). What is more, R&D subsidies are directed
towards very few high-technology industries — above all to the electronics and the aerospace industry
— and often go along with investment and production subsidies, as the Airbus case demonstrates.
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In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT signatories have made a new attempt to
restrict the use of subsidies for industrial policy purposes. The Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Duties introduced a so-called "traffic lights" approach that divides subsidies in three categories:
(i) prohibited; (ii) actionable (i.e., these subsidies can be countervailed); (iii) non-actionable. The "red
light" group includes export subsidies and subsidies that can be roughly characterised as import sub-
stitution subsidies.
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1 These subsidies are actionable in any case, regardless of whether they are specific
or not. The "green light" (non-actionable) category covers non-specific subsidies, R&D subsidies,
regional subsidies, and environmental subsidies. A subsidy is considered as specific if it is granted only
to a limited number of well-defined industries or enterprises. Although most R&D subsidies are12
designed to promote specific industries, R&D subsidies are non-actionable as long as public funds cover
not more than 75 percent of the costs of industrial research and not more than 50 per cent of pre-
competitive development research. To benefit from non-actionability, "green light" subsidies are to be
notified to and approved by the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. All
subsidies that fall neither into the "red light" nor into the "green light" category are defined as
actionable ("yellow light" category).
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Although the WTO Subsidies Agreement clarified some of the issues that caused frequent disputes
(Schott 1995), it suffers from at least two major weaknesses that might give rise to further conflicts in
international trade, especially with a view to high-technology competition. First, countervailing duties
imposed by third countries are the only enforcement mechanism of both the WTO Subsidies Agreement
and the Tokyo Round Subsidy Code. To initiate a countervailing duty investigation a signatory has to
prove that subsidies of an offended trading partner violate existing WTO regulations and that the dom-
estic industry is "experiencing injury" as a result of these subsidies. Thus, industries and enterprises
suffering from subsidies abroad are the real supervisors of the WTO subsidy regulations. This "de-
centralized" supervision system has proved to be rather ineffective on several grounds:
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(i) Many kinds of subsidies, especially investment subsidies and R&D subsidies, do not cause
measurable competition distortion effects for several years. By the time the effects become obvious, the
relevant subsidies have often been phased out, and it may become almost impossible to prove that the
subsidies caused material injury.
(ii) The current subsidy regulations cannot prevent governments from granting subsidies that are
distorting international competition because a proof of material injury is a first and indispensable step in
a countervailing duty investigation. Hence, countervailing duties can only mitigate the competition
distortions once they have occurred.
(iii) The countervailing duties approach poses the danger of retaliation, especially in high-technology
industries, where the time lag between subsidies and the resulting competition distortion effects is
usually quite long. Under these conditions, the imposition of a countervailing duty by a trading partner
might be judged as arbitrary and unfair by the offended country.
(iv) Countervailing measures may be abused for protectionist purposes and —due to their price
effects — may further distort international competition.
In view of these shortcomings, the WTO Subsidies Agreement should be reformed by (1) introducing
a notification system aiming at an assessment of all planned subsidies prior to their implementation and
(2) by defining quantitative thresholds for the provision of subsidies:
(1) With respect to the implementation of a multilateral notification system the aid supervision
procedure of the European Union can serve as a reference system.
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4 A multilateral subsidy supervision
should stipulate that all plans to grant new or to alter existing subsidies are to be notified to and
approved by the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (CSCM).
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should be entitled to examine the notified plans and to decide whether they are compatible with the
WTO Subsidies Agreement. In the course of the investigation, the CSCM should take into account
written comments by third signatories that might be affected by the notified subsidy. After the CSCM
has made its decision, any signatory concerned should have the opportunity to initiate a panel procedure
against the CSCM ruling in accordance with the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Given that a
signatory grants a subsidy in violation of a final CSCM or WTO panel ruling, the CSCM should be
empowered to require a repayment of the subsidy to the respective national government. The potential
threat of a repayment may give an incentive to recipient firms and industries to ask their respective
national governments to present an approval of the CSCM before granting the subsidy, and may,
therefore, lead to some sort of a self-restraint. Only if a signatory does not react to any of the CSCM or
WTO panel rulings within an appropriate time period (e.g., two months after the final decision), third13
parties would be entitled — as a last resort — to initiate a countervailing duty procedure according to
the regulations of the current WTO Subsidies Agreement.
To facilitate a multilateral aid supervision, the current traffic lights approach should be reformed by
categorizing all subsidies in either prohibited subsidies or subsidies that are allowed under certain con-
ditions. This can easily be done by just skipping the "yellow light" category. Although this category is
defined by default, it is obvious from the definitions of the "red light" and "green light" subsidies that it
covers all specific subsidies not being explicitly mentioned in the "green light" group. As a consequence,
all non-specific subsidies except for the current "red light" group, i.e. export subsidies and import sub-
stitution subsidies, would be admissible. Thus, a workable and clear-cut definition of specificity is an
important prerequisite for an effective subsidy supervision.
(2) The WTO Subsidies Agreement fails to provide unequivocal guidelines for measuring specificity.
According to the agreement, the following factors should be considered in determining whether a sub-
sidy programme is specific or not:
- "the use by a certain number of enterprises;
- the predominant use by certain enterprises;
- the grant of disproportionally large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises; and
- the manner in which discretion is exercised by administering authorities" (Subsidy Agreement,
Art. 2.1(c)).
Besides being obviously rather vague and ambiguous and thus giving rise to disputes in inter-
pretation, these guidelines do not take sufficient account of the economic effects resulting from firm-
specific or industry-specific subsidies. From an economic point of view, the main objective of specificity
rules is to limit the competitive distortions due to subsidies that are mainly directed at a single industry
or enterprise. It can be realistically assumed that the extent of competition distortions depends on the
share of production, investment, or research and development costs that is covered by the public
funding. Hence, the current rules could be considerably improved by defining quantitative thresholds
that limit the provision of subsidies to a certain fraction — say, 5 per cent — of the respective subsidy
base.
With a view to R&D subsidies, it is certainly by far too optimistic to expect that governments will
agree on a 5 per cent threshold in the near future. The "safe harbour provision" (Schott 1995) for R&D
subsidies which was agreed upon in the Uruguay Round negotiations rather points in the opposite
direction. It is obvious that the current maximum, i.e. a public funding of up to 75 per cent of R&D
costs, will give a recipient firm a considerable competitive edge and might thus lead to major conflicts in
high-technology trade and competition. Under these conditions, the levelling-down of current thresholds
seems to be a necessary and highly desirable policy goal.
As empirical research indicates, high-technology R&D can be expected to generate cross-border
externalities (see Chapter I). Thus, new technological knowledge can be no longer assumed to be totally
exclusive. If national governments were to take these international spillovers of domestic innovations
into account, they should have strong incentives to cooperate internationally.
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international cooperation might be the mututal opening up of national subsidy funds for high-technology
development. This approach would allow firms located in third countries an open access to national
subsidy funds if — and only if — third countries are ready to open access to their subsidy budgets on a
reciprocal basis.
To provide an incentive to open up national subsidy funds, one could also consider a provision that,
as a general rule, lowers the threshold for high-technology subsidies to 30 and 15 per cent of the costs of
basic and applied R&D respectively, but allows a higher public funding up to the current limits if a
national research programme provides an open access for firms located in third countries. For practical
purpose, this approach may require the implementation of the following general rules:14
(i) An R&D subsidy programme should only be regarded as open if at least two foreign firms are
participating in the programme;
(ii) the objectives of the open fund are formulated by the respective national government and must be
met by both domestic and foreign firms;
(iii) domestic and foreign firms should be treated equally with respect to patents and copyrights that
emerge from the funded research;
(iv) the open access to national funds should not be linked to a cooperation with a domestic firm.
To facilitate a multilateral subsidy supervision and an international cooperation in public funded
R&D, the WTO should publish annual reports on recent developments in national subsidy schemes of
leading OECD countries. A multilateral monitoring of current subsidization practices could also help to
prevent international conflicts arising from a misinterpretation of the objectives and potential effects of
national subsidy programmes (Ostry 1996).
b. Public Procurement: Conflict Resolution by National Courts
Public Procurement in advanced industrial economies covers a significant part of overall market de-
mand. Non-defence public procurement in the member states of the European Union is estimated to
represent about 7-10 per cent of gross domestic product.
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use their demand for goods and services in order to achieve aims of technology and industrial policy.
The GATT procurement code of the Tokyo Round (in force since 1981) established for the first time
internationally binding rules that secured foreign competitors open and undiscriminatory access to
bidding procedures for public procurement of goods (though not yet of services).
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conditioned most-favoured-nation clause, i.e. it applies only to the relationships between those con-
tracting parties of GATT that have actually signed the code.
The Tokyo Code which was at that time widely regarded as one of the most far-reaching achieve-
ments of the Tokyo Round Agreements (see Stern and Hoekman 1987) committed only central govern-
ments and directly related entities to internationally open tenders, (i.e. those surpassing certain threshold
levels of tender value). The rather limited range of the Tokyo Code — covering less than ten per cent of
non-defence public procurement in the United States and the European Community (see Messerlin
1994) — clearly constrained its impact from the outset and goes a long way to explain its actually very
limited economic consequences. As a part of the Uruguay Round accord, the new Government Procure-
ment Agreement (GPA) — in force from 1 January 1996 — extends the reach of the Tokyo code to
potentially all kinds of non-defence procurement, i.e. to all non-defence goods and services.
The GPA is one of the three major agreements of the Uruguay Round that are not included in the so-
called Single-Undertaking procedure. This means that these agreements apply only to their signatories,
not to all contracting parties of the World Trade Organisation at large.
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9 The potential value of con-
tracts that will be covered by the GPA in signatory states is roughly estimated to about $400 billion
annually in current prices.
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There are mainly two areas in which the GPA breaks new ground by the standard of its Tokyo Code
predecessor. These concern (i) extensions of the coverage provided by the GPA, and (ii) disciplines
imposed by the GPA on signatories:
(i) Coverage of the GPA: The principle of exchange of "trade concessions" that has governed all
multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT means in the context of GPA that con-
tracting parties concede
- "items" (i.e. certain groups of goods and services) to be opened to foreign competition in public
tenders, and
- "entities" (public or semi-public bodies) designated to open their tenders for bids by foreign
suppliers.15
The new GPA extends the range with respect to both "entities" and "items" concerned. Under the new
agreement (Article I), all tenders regarding rentals or leases of goods and the procurement of services
shall be included.
These general extensions are, however, limited by exemptions listed in the Annex of the Agreement
for each signatory state.
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1 Limits concerning goods are listed as exemptions, limits concerning services
apply to all items that are not explicitly enumerated. This distinction is in accordance with the different
philosophies of regulation in the GATT (for goods) and the GATS (for services). The institutional
solutions chosen in service sectors are likely to favour bilateral deals of sectoral reciprocity, thus under-
mining attempts to arrive at a multilateral framework. A similar tendency prevails in the so-called
exempted areas of public procurement of goods, notably of telecommunications equipment. As far as
public or semi-public "entities" are concerned, the new GPA has in principal been extended to "sub-
central" entities, i.e. basically regional and local government entities. However, those sub-central enti-




There are two major problems involved in the definition of "public entities". First, the power of the
contracting party — the central government — to control the conduct of sub-central entities may be
rather limited, e. g. in the case of federal member states. Second, previously "public firms", once in-
cluded in international arrangements on public procurement, may become privatized, thus leaving other
contracting parties with a loss of "trade concessions" formerly granted to them.
(ii) Disciplines Imposed by the GPA (see Hoekman and Mavroides 1995b): According to the two
basic principles embedded in the GPA, suppliers from other signatory states should benefit from the
conditional MFN clause, and thus tendering procedures should not entail any discrimination between
domestic suppliers and suppliers from other signatory states. In turn, discrimination against suppliers
from third countries (i. e. non-members of the GPA) is still allowed, which is consistent with the
philosophy of the WTO as an open club.
A core achievement of the new GPA is that foreign suppliers discriminated against in a national
tendering process can use the so-called challenge procedure, i.e. they can submit their appeal directly to
a ruling by the courts of the country that issued the respective tender, and these courts are then obliged
to provide reasonably rapid proceedings.
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Moreover, "offsets" (i.e. deviations from the GPA) are explicitly prohibited by Art. XVI, meaning
that additional requirements attached to a bid on a national public tender (e.g. local content, counter-
trade and the like) are to be considered illegal. Furthermore, the GPA does not contain any safeguard
clause that could allow signatory states to refrain from or to circumvent their obligations under this
agreement. On the other hand the GPA does not contain any provision against collusion among bidding
domestic firms, which is left to the competence of domestic competition policy.
The regulations of the GPA, which by themselves appear to be quite strict ones,
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4 may yet be under-
mined by regulations of the TRIPs Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property) of
the Uruguay Round. This means in particular that a national government will still be allowed to specify
the conditions of a tender, if "there is no sufficiently precise or intelligible way of describing the pro-
curement requirements and provided that words such as "or equivalent" are included in the tender docu-
mentation" (Article VI.3 GPA).
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international competition whenever they think it to be appropriate.
In practice, foreign firms affected by discrimination in public tendering procedures will weigh the
possible advantages of a court ruling in their favour against the disadvantages of possibly foregoing the
good will of the respective government. In the longer term, however, the opportunities established for
foreign suppliers' access to domestic court procedures should work in the direction that national govern-
ments will increasingly behave more strictly according to the rules laid down in the GPA.16
Although, clearly, the GPA is a major step in the right direction, there remain also major problems
unsolved:
- At present, WTO regulations still allow legal subsidies to R&D activities and subsidies on regional
policy grounds. This opens the gate for abuse in national procurement: e.g. a national government
may grant R&D subsidies and then define the terms of a later procurement tender on the basis of
those specific R&D requirements that only a domestic firm can possibly meet. Bidders from the
outside would quite obviously have little chance to succeed in such a procurement tender.
- Decisions of governments on matters of national security are exempted from WTO regulations.
Obviously, clauses of this kind can also be misused, in particular with respect to the treatment of
dual-use goods and services (i.e. goods and services that can be used for both military (security)
and civilian purposes).
- The many national exemptions in the GPA with respect to public entities and items (or sectors) are
likely to encourage bilateral bargaining, which is obviously not in the spirit of an international and
multilateral framework of trade regulations.
- The question of what has to be considered as a public enterprise or as an enterprise under
significant influence of government, can be hardly answered on the basis of common criteria across
countries. As this definition is highly critical for the assessment of trade concessions in inter-
national trade negotiations, there is a strong need for further international agreements on this
matter.
As the new GPA code entered into force by 1 January 1996, it remains to be seen, how effective this
code will prove to be, and whether the problems enumerated above will in fact put into question the
overall spirit of the whole venture.
2. Market Access and Structural Impediments
In addition to subsidies and public procurement practices, international competition in high-technology
goods is distorted by a variety of other barriers to market access, including "structural" impediments to
trade and investment. Trade and investment are in fact two major channels for the international diffusion
of technology. In exporting countries the foreign trade outlet enables technology enterprises to exploit
economies of scale in production and facilitates their recovering of R&D expenditures. In importing
countries user industries benefit from access to the most advanced technology-intensive capital goods,
components, and services at competitive prices, often a precondition for their own international com-
petitiveness. Consumer welfare, too, is enhanced by the supply of high-tech consumer goods and ser-
vices, again at competitive prices. From this one might infer that governments should be interested in
open markets for technology goods and services.
In practice, however, barriers to market access prevail. Some barriers, like tariffs, certain anti-
dumping practices, voluntary export restraint agreements, and safeguards, are deliberate attempts to
shield domestic producers against competition from technologically superior, or simply less expensive,
foreign suppliers, often with the intention of providing them a respite for catching-up. Others, like gov-
ernment regulatory measures and technical standards, are often the by-product of differences in national
cultures, policy objectives, and technology practices which may be difficult to reconcile internationally.
And still others, like barriers to access to private technology "clubs" or to national dealer networks, are
the result of restrictive, though not necessarily illicit, business practices. All these practices are potential
sources of economic and political friction.17
a. Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers
Tariffs, traditionally the preferred instrument to restrict market access, have greatly lost importance in
the course of repeated GATT rounds. The Uruguay Round resulted in a (further) lowering of import
duties for industrial goods by 38 per cent in developed countries, from 6.3 to 3.9 per cent on average.
43 per cent (up from 20 per cent) of the total value of industrial products imported by developed coun-
tries are now entering duty-free, and only 5 per cent (down from 7 per cent) are subject to peak rates
(GATT 1994). Equally important as the reduction of tariffs is that developed economies have now
accepted a binding of virtually all their tariff lines on industrial products, thereby greatly improving the
security of market access.
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chemicals and pharmaceuticals, were also subject to the elimination or significant reduction of tariffs;
on important electronics items, such as semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and
computer parts, tariff cuts of 50 per cent and above were achieved. Yet, for certain items, especially in
the field of consumer electronics, substantial tariff barriers persist. Their reduction should be made part
of a concerted multilateral effort to improve market access in which the European Union, the United
States, and the major East Asian economies should take the lead.
With MFN tariffs rendered increasingly obsolete as measures of protection, at least in developed
economies, non-tariff barriers to trade and market access have received growing attention. Among
border measures, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards are increasingly applied in
high-technology trade. They are treated in the following chapter. The much criticized Voluntary Export
Restraints (VER), a frequently applied substitute for these measures, shall be phased out as a result of
the Uruguay Round. No less significant than border measures are the already mentioned structural
impediments inside the borders: government regulatory practices, technical standards, and restrictive
business practices. They may be deliberately designed in such way as to discriminate against imported
products: luxury taxes on certain classes of automobiles, the U.S. corporate average fuel economy law
(CAFE) (see Kleinfeld 1995), costly and time-consuming testing, certification and conformity assess-
ment procedures for technology-intensive products, limitations to foreign ownership in business sectors
deemed "strategic". Discriminatory measures are an offence against Article HI of the GATT which
establishes the principle of national treatment (non-discrimination) of imported products, a guiding
principle of the multilateral trading system. Such measures are therefore challengeable under the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism. Often, however, structural impediments simply reflect differences in
national value systems, historic institutional settings, and grown systems of business culture (like the
systems of corporate governance). While they may form effective barriers to foreign entry, the WTO
recognizes the diversity of national business cultures, institutional settings, and policy approaches which
are at the heart of comparative advantage (Ostry 1996: 159) and competition among which is indeed a
condition for advancement. It is no wonder, then, that the Uruguay Round has made only limited
progress in this difficult area. To be sure, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, concluded
under the Tokyo Round, was revised and strengthened and Article XXIH of GATT was clarified. What
is still missing is, among others, an agreed catalogue of government practices (including omissions)
considered to be (challengeable) structural impediments as well as "objective" criteria for determining
whether and to what extent a market is indeed "contestable" (Ostry 1996: 159) and if not, how this
situation can be remedied.
In the field of high technology, market presence through foreign direct investment is no less important
than market access through trade. Domestic presence is often critical to success in following market
trends, gaining access to the R&D infrastructure, marketing research-intensive products with short
product cycles and high sunk costs, and responding to marketing needs. At the same time, foreign
investment is an important channel for the international diffusion of technology, including skills. In spite
of these microeconomic and macroeconomic benefits, the notion of national treatment, while being
accepted in principle, is not yet fully applied to investment.18
Governments seek to attract greenfield investment from foreign high-technology enterprises through a
great variety of financial incentives and/or through trade pressure. At the same time they often restrict
market presence in business sectors deemed "strategic", they oppose the acquisition of domestic tech-
nology firms by foreign investors, or they restrain access to national technology programmes. True, with
the world-wide process of deregulation and privatisation now underway, an opening of the respective
sectors to foreign investment often goes hand in hand. For instance, in telecommunications, a high-
technology service sector, deregulation in Europe has promoted foreign entry as well as the formation of
international strategic alliances with non-European partners. Still, in all countries of the triad and even
more so in emerging and developing economies obstacles and market distortions persist, as foreign
investors are denied effective market presence.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is but a first step
to a multilateral investment agreement. The Agreement is narrow in its focus, being limited to the trade-
related aspects of investment, and here in particular to local-content and trade-balancing requirements
which are expressly prohibited. This prohibition applies whether the measures are mandatory or are
required in return for an incentive or advantage. The TRIMs Agreement had a poor start: Under the
U.S.-Japan Auto Agreeement of 1995, the Japanese car manufacturers entered into a "voluntary" com-
mitment to raise the U.S. content of their transplants in the United States and to meet NAFTA local
content standards by 1998 "in order to boost U.S. and North American content in their vehicles."USIS
1995b: 1 l).This commitment, like the other commitments under the Agreement, will be monitored by "a
new, effective monitoring system jointly developed by the U.S. industry working closely with the U.S.
government" (USIS 1995b). It remains to be seen whether the auto agreement will serve as a model for
circumventing the TRIMs Agreement by "voluntary" commitments or whether it remains a one-time
transgression.
What is needed beyond the TRIMs Agreement is a General Agreement on Investment (GAI) the scope
of which is not limited to trade-distorting measures. This agreement should guarantee the right of estab-
lishment and full national treatment (Lawrence 1996: 29), subject only to exceptions which are clearly
and narrowly defined (e.g., national security) and open to judicial review.
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addressed under a GAI should be: Access to government technology-support programmes; state-sanc-
tioned monopolies and other sector-specific reservations; most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment; trans-
parency; barriers to foreign takeovers; performance requirements; investment incentives; restrictive
business practices and competition policy; investment protection; access to technology; payments and
transfers; movement of key personnel and data; and a dispute settlement mechanism for resolving
conflicts not only between governments, but between governments and investors (Graham 1996; Price
1996; Aaron 1995).
Work for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is currently under way in the OECD. This
takes account of the fact that most of the issues at stake are less controversial among industrialized
countries than with emerging and developing economies. Nevertheless, the aim must be for an agreement
under the WTO to complement the GATT and GATS Agreements and covering these countries as well,
though initially a WTO agreement may be less far-reaching in scope and commitments than a MAI
under the OECD:
In the face of what has been perceived "as inadequate" access to markets due to structural impedi-
ments, effective market access has become the catchword for triggering (and/or rationalizing) unilateral
trade measures aimed at forcing open foreign markets and securing targeted market shares for imported
(technology) products, thus circumventing the laborious procedure of negotiating away specific ob-
stacles. This was especially the U.S. approach towards Japan under (the threat of) Section 301 in the
cases of semiconductors, flat glass, telecom equipment, medical equipment and, recently, autos and auto
parts. The European Community has as yet made little use of its New Commercial Policy Instrument
(NCPI) introduced in 1984 and its successor, the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR). Between 1984 and
1994 only four examination procedures were opened. In one case the EU obtained a favourable GATT19
decision, in the three other cases the disputed practices were discontinued without the EU taking retali-
atory measures (Beekmann 1995: 59 f.). With access of firms to the new TBR "liberalized" relative to
the old NCPI, "it is likely that the use of the instrument will be more frequent in the future" (Beekmann
1995: 75). In the face of effectively closed markets, with no clearly identifiable — and yet quite ef-
fective — barriers to entry, taking recourse to market opening instruments such as Section 301 or the
Trade Barriers Regulation appears at first sight an appropriate way of approaching the obstacles. The
temptation of a unilateral approach is all the greater since experience in the semiconductor and auto-
mobile cases, and in cases which were resolved with less publicity under the threat of these instruments,
may well lead to the conclusion that this is indeed a successful means of enforcing market access.
Yet there are serious arguments against a "managed trade" approach, especially if applied uni-
laterally. First, unilateral action undermines the multilateral trading system which is an international
public good. Secondly, a unilateral approach lends itself only to countries or trading blocs with a high
bargaining leverage, such as the United States and the European Union, with the rest of the world put at
a clear disadvantage. It is therefore liable to misuse as an instrument of power politics. Thirdly, because
of this there is a strong presumption that any concession achieved will be at the expense of third parties.
This is even true if the claimant pretends not to seek preferred treatment over other foreign supplier
countries, since the defendant country may not be prepared to open its market for imports generally and
may well curtail existing market shares of third parties in favour of the economic superpower involved.
Moreover, follow-up measures are discussed bilaterally without the participation of third parties
(Zeidler 1995). Fourthly, lack of market access is often due to insufficient own marketing effort. Third-
country suppliers which undertook such effort at high cost will find their investment depreciated by the
easy access offered to their foreign competitors as a result of government pressure.
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than not quantitative import targets can only be met through active involvement and commitment of
domestic suppliers in the country concerned. This encourages collusive agreements among these firms
and furthers the cartelization of the respective market, a result which is counterproductive to economic
efficiency.
With the dispute settlement procedure greatly improved as a result of the Uruguay Round, there is
therefore a strong case for taking resort to multilateral rather than unilateral action. Article XXIII: l(b),
while not yet tested in practice, may offer access to the GATT dispute settlement procedure in cases
where a contracting party finds that "any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agree-
ment is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being im-
peded as the result of the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement"[ovjn emphasis] ("non-violation clause"). The Articles
of Agreement of GATT thus seem to offer a multilateral route to dispute settlement even in cases of
"structural" impediments, including private restraints of trade (Ostry 1996: 160 f.). This route should
be tested and, if found inadequate, be improved.
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b. Technical Norms and Standards
A major issue concerning market access are technical norms and standards. Generally speaking,
standards, whether aimed at social objectives like human health and safety (regulatory standards) or at
reducing transaction and information costs (compatibility standards), can be considered as welfare
enhancing (Hoekman and Mavroides 1995a: 10 f). Yet, they may also serve as instruments to promote
the international competitiveness of national industries, and they may act as barriers to trade and market
access. In both cases they give rise to friction. In consideration thereof, in the Tokyo Round the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) was concluded. In the Uruguay Round this Agreement was
revised and strengthened in several respects. The Agreement now applies to all member countries of the
WTO rather than to a limited number of signatories only, and it now covers not only the central govern-
ment bodies but, though with major reservations, local government and non-governmental bodies, too.20
In the latter cases the member countries "shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to
them to ensure compliance" with the provisions of the Agreement.
The Agreement establishes national treatment and MFN status as the guiding principles. It obliges the
member countries to ensure that technical regulations as well as conformity assessment procedures are
not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. The key concept of unnecessary obstacles has been clarified to the effect that
regulations and procedures shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Among such legitimate objectives are
national security requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health or
safety; animal or plant life or health; or the environment. Where relevant international standards exist
they shall be used as a basis for national technical regulations, except if this would be ineffective or in-
appropriate because of "fundamental" climatic, geographical or technological factors. Wherever ap-
propriate, member countries shall specify technical regulations in terms of performance rather than
design requirements. The Agreement sets forth provisions for the ex ante and ex post information on
technical regulations ("transparency"); equitable procedures for conformity assessment, testing and
certification including information requirements, the respectance of confidentiality of information about
products; equitable fees; recognition of conformity assessment in other member countries; and con-
sultation and dispute settlement according to the rules of the WTO Understanding.
Standards are set by the government, private standards organisations, and individual enterprises or
alliances. There are no clear-cut boundary lines between the three: The — now dropped — European
HDTV norm was agreed between the European Community and leading European manufacturers. As
major, and sometimes sole, buyers of specific technology products, large state enterprises or mon-
opolies, like railroads, post and telecommunications, and other public utilities, take a decisive influence
on the relevant technical standards. Most of the standards are set by the industrial standards organ-
isations. In Europe, eighteen national organisations like DIN in Germany, with about 25,700 standards
(1986), Afnor in France (13,400), or BSI in the United Kingdom (9,400) (U.S. Congress 1992: 63),
work together in CEN, the Comite Europeen de Normalisation, CENELEC, the Comite Europeen de
Normalisation Electrotechnique, and ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute,
reaching even beyond the European Union. Standard decisions are taken by qualified majority under a
system of weighted votes (U.S. Congress 1992: 70). In the United States, the process is more com-
plicated. Approximately 400 organizations, working independently of one another and only part of them
coordinating their activities in ANSI, the American National Standards Institute, are involved in
standards development (U.S. Congress 1992: 49 ff.). This puts obvious limits to any attempt to arrive at
a binding plurilateral standards setting procedure following the European model. On the international
level, only seventeen out of 89,000 standards used by the United States in 1989 were adopted from ISO
standards; a shortcoming which has been criticized as violating the GATT Standards Code (Dhar 1992:
149 ff.).
In standards enforcement, there are even as many as 44,000 jurisdictions in the United States,
resulting in "overlapping responsibility and redundant standards and regulations. In some cases, the
products are regulated directly through inspection or testing programmes, or both. In other cases, an
approval body may have to certify that products meet standards set by a particular state or municipal
government. This becomes a technical barrier in cases where states and municipalities have regulations
that apply different standards, or where certification requirements differ."
5
0 When testing organizations
even within the U.S. need multiple state and local accreditation, is it conceivable that the principle of
home country control be applied in trans-Atlantic (and/or trans-Pacific) trade? In the European Com-
munity, this principle ("country-of-origin" principle; mutual recognition of standards and procedures) is
a cornerstone of the so-called New Approach to standardisation adopted as part of the Single Market
programme. It is coupled, though, with minimal harmonisation of performance requirements and even,
where necessary to ensure compatibility and interconnection, of design requirements as well as of testing21
and certification procedures. Under the New Transatlantic Marketplace, a key component of the New
Transatlantic Agenda endorsed at the U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid on December 3, 1995, the United
States and the European Union undertake to work towards agreements recognizing each other's testing
and certification of products in a number of sectors, such as computers, telecommunications and busi-
ness equipment (USIS 1995a: 9; USIS 1995c: 16). This is a first step into the same direction.
In new areas of high-technology, the problem of an international harmonisation of compatibility
standards is increasingly being "solved" by standard-setting of leading firms or strategic international
alliances which seek to promote their own standards internationally, often in competition with rival
groups, by-passing the traditional standards organisations. Among the examples are DOS vs. Apple and
OS/2; VHS vs. Betamax and Video 2000; Hi-8 vs. S-VHS; GSM vs. CDMA and PDC (the respective
standards for mobile phones in Europe, the U.S. and Japan); etc. While the problem of international
compatibility is solved to the extent that a firm standard is able to succeed as a new industry standard,
issues of market power and collusive behaviour, including "fair" access to the "club" for competing
firms, may arise. This poses problems for international competition policy.
3. Dumping, Anti-Dumping and Competition Policies
a. Private versus Public Conduct in Trade and Competition
Apart from public obstacles to, and distortions of, high-technology trade and competition, trade-related
barriers to market entry raised by private companies become increasingly important. This also means a
greater role for competition policies and their international coordination. Existing international trading
rules cover private business conduct to the extent that dumping practices are involved. An issue of
particular interest in this context is the question as to whether anti-dumping policies should — and
could — in future be replaced by genuine competition policies. Competition policy will also have to deal
with private business practices which so far are not subject to international disciplines but may equally
disrupt international trade and competition. These include various forms of international technological
cooperation.
The dumping practices of companies and the anti-dumping policies of governments both lead to
conflicts between countries as well as inside the borders. The international conflicts mainly concern
producer interests. Foreign dumping causes friction if it hurts domestic industries. However, the policies
applied in response to dumping are no less contentious among trading partners if weak domestic
industries are protected against efficient foreign competitors. In the national context, friction arises if
anti-dumping policies work to the detriment of consumers and user industries.
Defined as selling abroad at prices below "normal value", dumping is assumed to be unfair per se,
regardless of its overall welfare impact. For protection measures to ensue, it is normally sufficient that
dumping is shown to cause "injury" (e.g. sales, employment or profit losses), or threaten to do so, to a
domestic industry or retard its establishment. Anti-dumping therefore has become the instrument of
choice for industries seeking to reduce competition from imports. In many cases, it is "just ordinary
protection with a good public relations programme" (Finger 1995: 29).
In contrast to its actual "capture" by special interests, the economic rationale of anti-dumping policy
(and indeed its original design in the United States in 1916 as an international extension of competition
law to deal with cross-border violations of anti-trust standards) is based on the existence of protected
monopolistic market structures in foreign countries facilitating "predatory" pricing strategies which
finally lead to a dominant position of exporting countries on the importer's market. For predatory
dumping to take place, the foreign monopolist (or cartel) must not only eliminate existing competition in
the importing country, but also be able to prohibit entry by new (domestic and foreign) competitors. He
must either establish a global dominance or convince the host government to pursue a policy that22
tolerates or supports entry restrictions (Hoekman and Mavroides 1994a). However, even the logical
foundation of the argument appears weak. It seems more reasonable to argue that both the predator and
the would-be victim would be better off by colluding with one another or by the takeover of the latter by
the former rather than going through the evidently expensive procedure of dumping (Tharakan 1994).
In actual fact, cases of successful predatory dumping remain largely undocumented. A recent study
for the OECD concludes that "in the overwhelming majority of anti-dumping cases, there was little or
no threat to competition in the domestic market" (OECD 1995: 7). This was true in more than 90 per
cent of the cases in which the US and EU imposed anti-dumping duties in the 1980s and especially so
with high-technology products like semiconductors, compact disc players and plain-paper copiers. In
particular, no clear evidence was found that Japanese producers of electronic products applied "monop-
olising" dumping designed to cripple foreign competitors.
Therefore, international dumping, as defined in anti-dumping regulations, largely appears to be
normal competitive business behaviour aimed at expanding foreign market shares or offsetting a sudden
fall in demand and exploit economies of scale. It is international price differentiation or "penetration"
pricing below average cost (and even below short-run "static" marginal cost, which can be significantly
higher than long-run "dynamic" marginal cost) that is consistent with free trade as it boosts competition
to the benefit of the domestic economy as a whole. In consequence, the policies to curb "dumping"
frequently harm the whole economy, as they pit the interests of a few, if powerful, domestic producers
against those of the domestic "many" and foreign competitors. A recent study by the U.S. International
Trade Commission (1995) counts the net welfare loss for the United States of the 279 anti-dumping
(and countervailing) duties that were in place in 1991 at roughly $1.6 billion.
Apart from the standard static welfare losses, anti-dumping measures have important dynamic conse-
quences. Other than patent policies which lower static welfare, but do so by increasing the long-run rate
of growth, anti-dumping action, by isolating national markets, tends to slow the pace of innovation (and
with it growth). It may induce industrial users of the protected product to relocate plants out of the
domestic territory, in order to avoid the duty, and in effect widen rather than close existing efficiency
gaps between foreign and domestic companies. By indirectly increasing state interference with markets
also in the exporting countries, policies may effectively bring about what they are supposed to fight:
public protection of a dumper's home market.
Anti-dumping policies are also closely intertwined with other trade-protective measures such as ex-
port-restraint arrangements which impair economic welfare as well. Actually, the two forms of inter-
vention have proved to be effective complements, as many anti-dumping cases were superseded by
"voluntary" export restraints (VER). The threat of formal action under the antidumping law was the
lever to force an exporter to accept a VER. It has also been shown, e.g. in the U.S.-Japan DRAMs
case, that anti-dumping measures originally targeted at a limited number of product variants finally ex-
tended into an agreement covering the whole range of the respective product group.
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b. Dumping and Anti-Dumping in High Technology
In high technology, the two basic forms of "dumping", i.e. regional price differentiation and (temporary)
pricing below cost, seem to be wide-spread business practices reflecting central characteristics of the
sector such as market segmentation, high fixed costs (especially up-front R&D expenditures), de-
creasing variable costs over time due to learning by doing, first-mover advantages, etc. All this should
make high-technology producers particularly vulnerable to anti-dumping measures, and especially so in
the early stages of production.
Competition on high-technology markets has also been described as demand-driven product differ-
entiation where the ability of suppliers to accurately forecast consumers' tastes (thereby creating
temporary market access barriers subject to quick erosion) counts more than lasting entry deterrence
based on an exclusive mastery of the technology at hand.
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empirical finding of relatively low degrees of supplier concentration on many high-technology markets
in the exporting countries pointing towards little leeway for predatory pricing. On balance, there are
even more possibilities — and stronger incentives — for a protectionist use of the anti-dumping
instrument in high technology than in "ordinary" business. In many cases, calculated dumping margins,
and actual duties imposed, are indeed extraordinarily high for high-technology products.
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Even though, in terms of numbers of cases, high-technology products have not been the main target
of anti-dumping policies, their incidence is high if measured by product (wide coverage of affected
product groups), market (high volumes of sales and trade) and supplier (broad representation of major
producers) characteristics. The largest case in the whole EC anti-dumping history, for instance, con-
cerns plain-paper copiers, with imports of $3.5 billion in 1992. In this case, 20 per cent duties on
Japanese photocopiers, originally introduced in 1987, were reimposed (and extended to larger models) in
October 1995 for three more years. The decision was reached with a close (8-7) majority in the Council
of Ministers which was sufficient only after voting rules were changed (from qualified to simple
majority) in March 1994. European imports of Japanese photocopiers have dropped sharply since the
introduction of anti-dumping duties, but the market share of Japanese producers has nonetheless in-
creased as many of them have moved production inside the European Union.
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Empirical analysis for a number of electronic products (color television sets, compact disc players
and plain paper photocopiers) from Japan on which anti-dumping duties were imposed by the United
States and the European Community reveals a strong tendency of anti-dumping policies in this sector to
protect domestic competitors rather than preserve competition in the long run (see Messerlin and
Noguchi 1995). The case studies investigate certain structural characteristics of the respective markets
and industries — entry barriers, relative home-market size, concentration ratios, market shares, static




Three results of the studies stand out:
First, declining government protection by tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as subsidies contrasts
with persisting low import penetration of the examined Japanese markets. Available evidence on private
restrictions against import competition, such as incompatible product standards agreed by domestic
companies or entry-deterring horizontal collusion among suppliers and vertical restraints through ex-
clusive distribution channels etc., is unable to explain the phenomenon. In fact, low degrees of supplier
concentration on the respective markets in Japan rather indicate that private entry barriers are moderate.
Moreover, a limited number of domestic newcomers and foreign investors have successfully entered the
markets considered in the analysis, the existence of interlocking "keiretsu" systems notwithstanding.
Second, factual exclusion of American and European exporters from the investigated Japanese mar-
kets has not evidently disadvantaged these companies in international competition. In particular, it has
not prevented them from exploiting scale economies in production nor discouraged R&D efforts which
for their profitability hinge on the number of units produced. Reliance on OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturing) agreements, for instance, by which firms are allowed to sell products of other
companies under their own brand name, permits segment-specific economies of scale to be utilized
without constraining the product range of each supplier.
Third, the case studies demonstrate that the recoupment of initial losses (and harvesting of some
additional gain) on which the success of any predatory scheme crucially depends is unlikely to happen.
An important factor here is (actual or potential) market entry by third-country suppliers, e.g. European
firms in the United States, challenging possible dominant positions of potential predators. It is also
shown that access to the basic technologies needed is relatively easy, which increases the contestability
of the markets in question.
In sum, little evidence on the possible existence of predatory or strategic dumping practices has been
found in empirical analysis.24
c. The Uruguay Round Approach to Anti-Dumping
The degeneration of anti-dumping measures into protective, selective, anti-competitive and strategic
trade policy devices has not been effectively contained in the Uruguay Round. The agreed changes will
hardly transform anti-dumping action into competition policy. An attempt was made to correct some of
the biases embodied in national anti-dumping regulations and remove the inconsistencies in the pro-
cedures used where rules often changed between cases and even methods within cases. However, no
standards of competition law were adopted, and a number of highly questionable practices were allowed
to continue if they are "appropriately" explained. Of particular relevance for high-technology products
in this context are the modifications regarding averaging methods in price comparisons and the treat-
ment of start-up costs.
In certain circumstances, and if appropriately explained, the new anti-dumping agreement allows the
national authorities to deviate from the general method of comparing average home prices with average
export prices or individual domestic transactions with corresponding individual transactions abroad. In-
stead, dumping investigators may compare a weighted average of domestic prices (omitting, if necess-
ary, low-priced sales outside the "ordinary course of trade") to individual export prices if the latter vary
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods. As this allows high-priced exports to
be disregarded in the calculations, it is a sure way of finding dumping in almost every case and
particularly so in cases where prices (and models) are as diverse and change as quickly as in high-tech-
nology products.
It may be an easy task for policymakers to offer plausible explanations for the chosen calculation
method that stand any possible challenge by the affected trading partners with relative ease. Past dispute
settlement panels in anti-dumping cases in general used to treat lack of explanation as reason to re-
commend that an anti-dumping duty be revised, not as reason for it to be removed. With the new general
("integrated") dispute settlement mechanism in place, this could possibly change in future, as panel
decisions no longer need the consent of the defending country. However, the specific dispute settlement
section of the anti-dumping agreement gives the national determination of dumping margins the benefit
of the doubt. It is explicitly recognized that the provisions of the agreement admit more than one per-
missible interpretation. The panel is only to ask whether the anti-dumping authorities reached their con-
clusion without explicit error of fact or reasoning. This will make it very difficult for it to reject an ex-
planation that has even the slightest plausibility (see Hindley 1994: 27).
The provisions of the agreement concerning start-up costs or sales below total unit costs (including a
"reasonable" profit margin) are equally ambiguous. On the one hand, below-cost sales in the exporter's
market have to be eliminated in the determination of the "normal value" if certain conditions are
given.
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than before (when elimination was a mere possibility). On the other hand, the agreement for the first
time requires non-recurring items of cost (like R&D expenditures), which benefit future production, to
be allocated over a longer period of time. In the case of start-up operations the costs at the end of the
start-up period are relevant. This should lower the calculated normal value and hence constrain the
finding of dumping. It could be particularly important in cases where in face of low home-country sales
(less than 5 per cent of the disputed export sales) constructed values instead of direct price comparisons
are used in the determination of dumping margins.
Other modifications of anti-dumping rules agreed in the Uruguay Round are a mixed blessing as well.
The 5-year sunset clause according to which anti-dumping measures automatically expire after five
years was adopted from existing EU legislation. However, its value appears to be limited: (1) not only is
it possible to extend the limit (and this is actually happening as recently shown in the EU-Japan copier
case noted above) but (2) the limit has also apparently not prevented European anti-dumping enforce-
ment to be as biased as U.S. practices. For similar reasons, the new "de minimis" provision which
requires the immediate termination of an anti-dumping investigation when the margin of dumping is less25
than 2 per cent of the export price, or the volume of dumped imports less than 3 per cent of the
respective total imports, seems unlikely to contain harassment of exporters in an effective way.
At the same time, the more elaborate requirements for an anti-dumping investigation to be initiated
after application may effectively lengthen the period of uncertainty about trading conditions, and thus
discourage imports, since there is no time limit in the pre-initiation phase as compared to the subsequent
stages. With regard to the determination of injury and the causal link between dumping and injury, the
new agreement provides little change over the preceding anti-dumping code of the Tokyo Round and so
allows considerable scope for arbitrary decision making (e.g. in the definition of "injured" domestic
industries which may include or exclude foreign subsidiaries) to continue.
By and large, the substantive and procedural conditions imposed by the new anti-dumping agreement
on policies in this area appear in themselves unable to effect substantial change. Part of the improve-
ments reached have also been eroded in national implementation legislation reflecting the political power
of protection-seeking interests. Apparently, even the smallest content of ambiguity of any word has been
intensely exploited, so amending anti-dumping procedures has been depicted as an activity with a pro-
ductivity close to Sisyphus's, as new provisions seem to be deviated from their initial purpose at a more
rapid pace than they were introduced (Messerlin 1995: 12). However, anti-dumping rules and practices
remain far removed from the standards of sound competition policy which they were originally supposed
to supplement at the international level. Disciplining anti-dumping policies should therefore rank high
among the market access issues on the post-Uruguay Round trade agenda.
d. Reforming Anti-Dumping Policy
The first-best solution, from an intervention-theoretic point of view, would be to substitute competition
rules and procedures, either harmonized and coordinated among nation-states or truly globalized, for
existing anti-dumping laws. This would allow the removal of distortions, such as abuse of a dominant
market position in the exporting country, at the source rather than merely compensating for them.
Howeyer, this is a long-term perspective at best, unlikely to materialize in the near future. It sharply
contrasts with political realities which are characterized by a proliferation of anti-dumping regulations
and unwillingness of the most prominent user countries and regions (the United States and the European
Union) to dispense with an expedient instrument of trade policy. Protection-seeking interests would have
to be accommodated in one form or another anyway which would leave little net value of abolishing
anti-dumping measures.
The prevailing political view is of raising international standards in the area of competition law, thus
reducing the need to invoke the anti-dumping law, i.e. competition laws working effectively alongside
the anti-dumping law without substituting for it. In fact, there have been only a few cases of anti-
dumping policies superseded by competition policies. Apart from the European Union, these are the
European Economic Area and, to a lesser extent, the Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Re-
lations Trade Agreement.
In face of the widely perceived political need to retain the anti-dumping option in trade policy,
reforming policy in this area could proceed on four tracks:
- Removal of trade and investment barriers in the exporting (and importing) countries.
- Ad hoc review of the state of competition (actual and potential) on the exporting-country markets and
of existing public barriers to entry (and presence) by foreign competitors.
- "Importing" competition-policy standards into anti-dumping legislation and raising the legal standing
of consumer and industrial-user interests in the investigations.
- Developing international competition rules.
The first track involves ongoing liberalization of trade on a reciprocal basis, including the removal of
remaining tariff, non-tariff and regulatory barriers to market access raised by governments, as well as26
the negotiation of an international investment agreement that guarantees foreign companies freedom of
establishment and national treatment in host countries. This will significantly change the environment
for predatory behaviour and make it even less likely to happen. By the same token, it weakens the
legitimation bases of anti-dumping policies. However, as international negotiations on broadly based
liberalization and deregulation take time, no quick impact on dumping practices and anti-dumping
measures can be expected.
A more immediate impact would have a multilateral agreement, as proposed by Hoekman and
Mavroides (1994a), providing for an examination (preferably by competition authorities) of market
characteristics (including private and public entry barriers) in the exporting country to precede any anti-
dumping investigation. The policy objective in this second track would be to establish whether the struc-
tural preconditions for economically harmful (i.e. reducing the importing country's welfare) dumping
strategies are given or not. An anti-dumping petition would consequently have to be turned down from
the outset, irrespective of the existence of dumping, if (1) the competition agency in the exporting coun-
try should find the accused firms neither engaged in anti-competitive practices nor benefitting from gov-
ernment-created or supported market access barriers against foreign companies, and (2) the corre-
sponding authorities of the importing country agree with the finding.
In the third track competition aspects are considered after an anti-dumping investigation has been
launched. The focus now shifts from the exporting to the importing country market where the quality of
the injury inflicted on domestic industries through foreign dumping apparently varies depending on the
state of competition. On highly concentrated markets with high entry barriers, for instance, "injury"
often means a reduction of non-competitive excess returns. "Dumping" would correspondingly work to
"disrupt" monopolistic market structures to the benefit of other domestic agents and enhance general
welfare.
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more comprehensively include the interests of consumers and industrial users and review the state of
competition on the domestic markets concerned. It could possibly also include an examination of
whether anti-dumping duties would help domestic industries to compete more effectively.
A more competition-oriented approach to anti-dumping cases could involve the adoption of compe-
tition policy concepts like the "relevant market" and "critical degrees of concentration" in anti-dumping
investigations, in order to correct the biases inherent in current anti-dumping concepts such as "like
product" and "major proportion of the domestic industry". Defining quantified "thresholds" (compar-
able to the "tariffication" process in the Uruguay Round) would facilitate multilateral negotiations in
this area. In addition to these re-interpretations of existing anti-dumping provisions, the appeals system
in anti-dumping cases could be substantially improved. As proposed by Messerlin (1995: 13), an anti-
dumping case could have to be passed from anti-dumping authorities to anti-trust agencies, e.g. from
DG I to DG IV in the European Commission or to the cartel offices in individual EU member states,
should a court ruling repeal the case for the formers" neglect of competition aspects. In sum, to the three
elements of an anti-dumping investigation (unfair trade, injury and causal link between the two) a fourth
element — competition analysis — would be added (see also Vandenbussche 1995). It would be a
logical complement to the pre-test of competition on the exporting-country market noted above.
The fourth track entails the codification of international competition rules. This would contribute
importantly to an eventual elimination of anti-dumping policies. Their final replacement by competition
policies is feasible, though, only with a high standard of integration between countries. This would
require realization of the "four freedoms" (i.e. complete liberalization of trade in goods, services, labour
and capital) plus agreement on common disciplines for, or mutual recognition of, certain policies and
regulations regarding in particular subsidies, government procurement, technical standardization, ser-
vices and, for that matter, competition. Removing the anti-dumping instrument accordingly seems to be
possible in the foreseeable future only for limited numbers of countries and typically in a regional con-
text. This, again, bears chances as well as risks, since increased competition — and related adjustment
pressures — inside the "club" might provoke compensatory anti-dumping action against outsiders.27
e. Towards Multilateral Competition Rules
International coordination, or harmonisation, of competition policies may not only help to contain
dumping practices, and counter-productive anti-dumping policies, but also prevent anti-competitive
business conduct in international trade in general. This may essentially take three forms:
- Exclusion of foreign suppliers from domestic markets by the exercise of horizontal market power
through collusive behaviour or vertical restraints of competition such as exclusive dealerships be-
tween companies of one country. This may effectively — and asymmetrically — thwart the liberal-
ization of trade negotiated by governments.
- Formation of export cartels among a country's firms and similar action to inhibit foreign competitors
on international markets with the ultimate effect of significantly raising international prices. With
asymmetric incidence of private trade barriers between countries, trading partners may even suffer
net losses from "public" liberalization in this case.
- Restraint of competition between companies from different countries in the form of strategic alliances
(frequently of a technological nature), cartels, mergers and aquisitions in particular. Again, this could
impair the benefits of liberalization. However, in the majority of cases, international cooperation
among firms seems to stimulate rather than reduce competition on national markets as these become
increasingly global in the course of trade liberalization.
Against this background, international policy-making in the field of competition faces two major
challenges:
(1) Adjusting existing rules and procedures in national competition policies — or building them from
scratch — and monitor their implementation, so as to remove — and prevent — trade-restrictive
and mercantilistic biases in competition policy. In particular, strict enforcement of the agreed pro-
visions would have to be guaranteed and export cartels prohibited if they go beyond a mere sharing
of expertise and services in supplying foreign markets. Export cartels may also be conducive to
collusive behaviour on domestic markets.
(2) Devising principles — and practical guidelines — for the international cooperation among national
agencies responsible for competition policy in order to resolve conflicts that may arise when private
restraints of competition simultaneously affect a number of national markets. Such conflicts are
likely to occur also if competition laws — and the weight given to competition as compared to other
policy aims — are largely identical between the countries concerned. This is so because in many
cases the impact of the anti-competitive practices will vary from country to country.
5
8 In the final
analysis, international action may require a supranational authority to coordinate the collection of
information, and to apply any sanctions to the firm or firms involved (see Hay 1995).
In general, greater market interpenetration due to the integration of national markets has resulted in
the need for competition policies to adjust to different circumstances of international competition (see
Lloyd and Sampson 1995: 686). More specifically, and with particular relevance to high-technology, an
important rationale, denoted by Soete (1995: 15), for international competition policy aimed at counter-
acting the emergence of world-wide cartels between global firms could be to challenge national strategic
policies based on arguments of dependence on "foreign" monopoly pricing. Other reasons for specific
(national as well as international) anti-trust concerns in high-technology refer to (1) network exter-
nalities (e.g. in computer software) which could bias industries towards monopoly as the value placed
on network membership by a consumer rises with the number of other people on the network; (2)
systems leverage by which a firm that controls one part of a system may spread its monopoly into
others through, e.g., cross-subsidization;
5
9 (3) standardization which may lend individual firms, and
groups of companies, considerable market power as consumers and user firms get "locked in" into the28
system and entry barriers, through costs of "switching" systems, are raised; and (4) innovation cartels
inhibiting the innovation process proper (by reducing the number of innovative efforts) and possibly
"spilling over" into other fields of activities such as production and marketing.
6
0
The actual development of international competition rules is still in its infancy. It could be advanced
through "case law" built into dispute settlement procedures based on existing GATT provisions. Of
particular interest in this context is the non-violation clause of GATT Article XXIII: l(b) designed to
address the concern of GATT members relating to a modification of negotiated concessions through
subsequent government action in areas that were either not addressed by the GATT or did not violate a
GATT obligation. An example could be an exemption by the competent anti-trust authorities granted to
private enterprises that effectively reduces market access opportunities for products of third countries
by establishing difficult-to-penetrate distribution channels.
6
1 In conjunction with a significantly
strengthened dispute settlement procedure, non-violation complaints could therefore lead to the opening
of foreign markets closed by private restrictive practices. However, the wording of the clause is too
general, and its reach too limited, for it to serve as a solid base for an effective international competition
policy. Its "structural" weakness is, by definition, not based on explicit provisions concerning anti-
competitive business conduct in international trade (with the exception of dumping).
This is different with the Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) proposed by an international
group of legal experts.
6
2 The Draft Code provides for minimum standards to be observed by the anti-
trust authorities in the participating countries (which must not include all WTO members as the DIAC
is designed as a plurilateral GATT-WTO agreement) in dealing with private restraints of competition
that affect international trade flows. The practices covered range from the formation of international
cartels to the abuse of dominant market positions and from horizontal to vertical restraint. An inter-
national competition agency, equipped with the right of an International Procedural Initiative, would
be entrusted to safeguard the application of the national law in cases where an inactive member state
would not take its own initiative; if necessary, it could sue in the national courts to ensure application.
Conflicts arising from impacts in one country of competitive restraints originating in an other would be
addressed taking advantage of the new WTO dispute settlement procedure. Even though this proposal as
a whole is fraught with a number of difficulties regarding its practical implementation and enforcement
as well as inevitable losses of national sovereignty,
6
3 it seems in principle to be well suited to meet the
challenges noted above, including the specific anti-trust issues related to high technology. It could
effectively flank the international trading order with an international competition regime.29
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